"RAND National Defense Research Institute."

"This research was sponsored by USF-I and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--P. vii.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 475-508) and index.

Part I. Setting the Stage -- Introduction: How Wars End -- The First Six Years -- Multi-National Force–Iraq Transition Planning and Execution, 2009–2010 -- Part II. Transition Management and Planning -- Transition Management -- The Influence of Washington and Baghdad on the Transition -- Part III. Executing the Transition and Retrograde of Forces -- Enduring Security Challenges -- Enhancing the Security Sector Capacity of the Government of Iraq -- Enabling an Expeditionary Embassy -- Reposture the Force -- Part IV. The Aftermath, Conclusions, and Recommendations -- After the Transition -- Conclusions and Recommendations -- Appendix A: Comments of Ambassador James Jeffrey -- Appendix B: Joint Campaign Plan—Base Document -- Appendix C: JCP Annex F—Transition -- Appendix D: USF‑I J4 Joint Plans Integration Center Input -- Appendix E: USF‑I J4 Department of State Transition Cell RAND History Report -- Appendix F: Joint Logistics Operations Center Input.

Over the course of the U.S. engagement in Iraq, the U.S. military managed hundreds of bases and facilities and used millions of pieces of equipment. The military was not only involved with security-related activities but also assisted in political and economic functions the host nation government or other U.S. departments would normally perform. A 2010 assessment identified that responsibility for 431 activities would need to be handed off to the government of Iraq, the U.S. embassy, U.S. Central Command, or other U.S. government departments. Ending the U.S. war in Iraq would also require redeploying over 100,000 military and civilian personnel and moving or transferring ownership of over a million pieces of property, including facilities, in accordance with U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book looks at the planning and execution of this transition, using information gathered from historical documents and interviews with key players. It examines efforts to help Iraq build the capacity necessary to manage its own security absent a U.S. military presence. It also looks at the complications that arose from uncertainty over just how much of a presence the United States would continue to have beyond 2011 and how various posttransition objectives would be advanced. The authors also examine efforts to create an embassy intended to survive in a hostile environment by being entirely self-sufficient, performing missions the military previously performed. The authors draw lessons from these events that can help plan for ending future wars.

Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.

Description based on print version record.