"RAND Arroyo Center.'

"This research was ... conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program"--Preface.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-121) and index.

Introduction -- Setting conditions for the 2008 Battle -- conditions on the eve of the Battle of Sadr city -- The Battle Begins -- Defeating JAM: operation Gold wall -- exploiting the Success of Battle -- Assessing the outcome of the Battle -- reimagining urban combat -- Appendix: Analysis of contemporary Arabic Language Sources on the Battle of Sadr city.

In late March 2008, a Shi’a uprising in Baghdad’s Sadr City district challenged the authority of the Government of Iraq (GoI) at its heart. The Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) overran GoI outposts in the district and barraged the International Zone with short-range rockets. The eruption of violence threatened to draw U.S. forces into a battle in a closely packed urban area inhabited by an estimated 2.4 million people, many of whom strongly supported the GoI’s main antagonist, Moqtada al-Sadr. U.S. casualties and collateral damage could have been substantial. Instead, through innovative tactics combining high-technology airborne surveillance and strike, elements of siege warfare and vigorous exploitation through civil military operations, coalition forces managed to subdue the uprising with minimum loss to U.S. forces and the civilian population. Success in this battle solidified Iraqi government control over all of Baghdad and throughout Iraq, creating conditions that enabled the United States to realize contemporary operational objectives in Iraq. The authors present the first full operational analysis of the battle and distill insights and lessons that can inform a broader understanding of urban operations, particularly those conducted as part of irregular warfare. This new paradigm can help the Army focus on what capabilities it will need in the future for such operations.

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