Command and control of joint air operations : some lessons learned from four case studies of an enduring issue / James A. Winnefeld, Dana J. Johnson.

By:

Winnefeld, James A, 1929- [author.]

Contributor(s):

Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 1991Description: xxi, 79 pages : illustrations ; 28 cmContent type:

text

Media type:

computer
unmediated

Carrier type:

online resource
volume

ISBN:

083301157X

Subject(s):

Unified operations (Military science)

LOC classification:

U260 .W56 1991

Online resources:

Online Access

Available additional physical forms:

Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.

Summary: This report examines the achievement of the principle of unity of effort from a narrow focus on the command and control of U.S. joint tactical air operations in four campaigns (Midway, the Solomons, Korea, and Vietnam) from 1942 to 1968 and extracts some lessons for future joint air operations. The authors distinguish between unity of effort and unity of command, a distinction that manifests itself in individual service doctrines, in joint operations, and, ultimately, in each of the Services' views of war. While unity of command is one of several steps necessary to achieve unity of effort, the authors recommend that debate should be centered around the accomplishment of unity of effort. The research was completed before the onset of combat operations in Kuwait and Iraq in early 1991. The authors hope to extend the analysis to cover that campaign in a subsequent publication.

Item type:

Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)

Holdings ( 0 )
Title notes ( 4 )

No physical items for this record

Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-79).

This report examines the achievement of the principle of unity of effort from a narrow focus on the command and control of U.S. joint tactical air operations in four campaigns (Midway, the Solomons, Korea, and Vietnam) from 1942 to 1968 and extracts some lessons for future joint air operations. The authors distinguish between unity of effort and unity of command, a distinction that manifests itself in individual service doctrines, in joint operations, and, ultimately, in each of the Services' views of war. While unity of command is one of several steps necessary to achieve unity of effort, the authors recommend that debate should be centered around the accomplishment of unity of effort. The research was completed before the onset of combat operations in Kuwait and Iraq in early 1991. The authors hope to extend the analysis to cover that campaign in a subsequent publication.

Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.

Description based on print version record.