Russia's Chechen wars 1994-2000 : lessons from urban combat / Olga Oliker.

By:

Oliker, Olga [author.]

Contributor(s):

Publisher: Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2001Description: xxv, 102 pages : 2 maps ; 23 cmContent type:

text

Media type:

computer
unmediated

Carrier type:

online resource
volume

ISBN:

0833029983
0833032488 (electronic bk.)
9780833029980
9780833032485 (electronic bk.)

Subject(s):

LOC classification:

DK511.C37 O44 2001

Online resources:

Online Access

Available additional physical forms:

Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.

Contents:

Introduction -- Grozny I: 1994-1995 -- Return to Grozny: 1999-2000 -- Conclusions.

Summary: An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that while the Russian military was able to significantly improve its ability to carry out a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, other important missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largely in the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This conscious decision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met with devastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served to study.

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"Arroyo Center."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-102).

Introduction -- Grozny I: 1994-1995 -- Return to Grozny: 1999-2000 -- Conclusions.

An examination of the difficulties faced by the Russian military in planning and carrying out urban operations in Chechnya. Russian and rebel military forces fought to control the Chechen city of Grozny in the winters of 1994-1995 and 1999-2000, as well as clashing in smaller towns and villages. The author examines both Russian and rebel tactics and operations in those battles, focusing on how and why the combatants' approaches changed over time. The study concludes that while the Russian military was able to significantly improve its ability to carry out a number of key tasks in the five-year interval between the wars, other important missions--particularly in the urban realm--were ignored, largely in the belief that the urban mission could be avoided. This conscious decision not to prepare for a most stressful battlefield met with devastating results, a lesson the United States would be well served to study.

Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.