Strategy-policy mismatch : how the U.S. Army can help close gaps in countering weapons of mass destruction /
Strategy-policy mismatch : how the United States Army can help close gaps in countering weapons of mass destruction
Timothy M. Bonds, Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Richard E. Darilek.
- xxv, 130 pages : illustrations, maps ; 26 cm
"RAND Arroyo Center." "Prepared for the United States Army."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 123-130).
Introduction -- Gaps Between Countering WMD and Prioritizing Resources -- Counter-WMD Missions and WMD-E Operations -- Illustrative WMD-E Scenarios and Ground Force Requirements -- Concluding Observations -- Appendix A: Selected National Security Documents and Joint and Service Doctrine -- Appendix B: DPRK and Syrian WMD Sites -- Appendix C: Scenario Context for DPRK Case Study -- Appendix D: Review of Available Estimates on Support Ratio in Iraq.
Although two successive presidents have determined that weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—particularly nuclear weapons in the hands of violent extremists—pose the greatest threat to the American people, and have decided that countering their proliferation is a top strategic priority, neither administration has made countering WMD a priority when it comes to allocating budgetary resources to that overarching national mission. In the public domain, little analysis exists that assesses the capacity and capabilities required by military forces to conduct WMD elimination (WMD-E) operations. As a result, public discussion of what capabilities the military requires for such operations generally omits or gives short shrift to requirements for the WMD-E mission. The purpose of this report is to address and analyze those requirements, namely, the ground force capacity (force size) and capabilities (force structure) needed to accomplish WMD-E missions and tasks. In particular, these analyses provide an informed description of the types and size of U.S. Army forces required to conduct WMD-E operations in a wide range of situations.