03296cam a2200445 i 4500001001000000003000500010005001700015008004100032020003500073020003800108027001900146037002200165040001900187043002100206050002200227100003400249245013100283264003700414300005400451336002600505337002600531337002800557338003600585338002700621500003000648500014600678504006400824505023200888520130901120530005802429610002602487610002402513650006202537650005102599710006202650710002202712710003102734856006602765999001902831101256375RAND20200811100746.0100302s2011    cauab    b    001 0 eng d  a0833051466 (pbk. : alk. paper)  a9780833051462 (pbk. : alk. paper)  aRAND/MG-835-AF  c$34.00fpaperback  aCstmoRcCstmoR  aa-is---aa-le--- 4aDS87.65bL36 20111 aLambeth, Benjamin S.eauthor.10aAir operations in Israel's war against Hezbollah :blearning from Lebanon and getting it right in Gaza /cBenjamin S. Lambeth. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c2011.  axxxiii, 388 pages :billustrations, maps ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"RAND Project Air Force."  a"The study, 'Israeli Air Operations Against Hezbollah,' was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project Air Force"--Pg. IV.  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 345-366) and index.0 aIntroduction -- Highlights of the Campaign -- Key Israeli Air Accomplishments -- Problems in Air Employment -- The Winograd Commission's Findings -- A Second Chance in Gaza -- The Second Lebanon War Reconsidered -- Conclusions.  aIn response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a “failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government’s decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF’s more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF’s conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.10aIsrael.bHel ha-avir.20aHizballah (Lebanon) 0aArab-Israeli conflicty1993-xAerial operations, Israeli. 0aLebanon War, 2006xAerial operations, Israeli.2 aProject Air Force (U.S.).bStrategy and Doctrine Program.2 aRand Corporation.1 aUnited States.bAir Force.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG835.html  c596832d596832