02762cam a2200457 i 4500001001900000003000500019008004100024010001800065020003500083020003200118020003800150020003500188027001900223035002000242037002200262040001900284043001200303050002100315100003600336245007100372264003700443300005100480336002600531337002600557337002800583338003600611338002700647500004300674500004800717500010300765504006400868505015500932520090501087530005801992650003302050650004502083700003302128710005902161710002202220856006202242rnd000000000043934RAND100621s2010    cauab    b    000 0 eng d  a   2010015059  a0833049763 (pbk. : alk. paper)  a0833049860 (electronic bk.)  a9780833049766 (pbk. : alk. paper)  a9780833049865 (electronic bk.)  aRAND/MG-982-RC  a(Sirsi) a595246  c$23.00fpaperback  aCstmoRcCstmoR  aa-pk---00aDS389b.J66 20101 aJones, Seth G.,d1972-eauthor.10aCounterinsurgency in Pakistan /cSeth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c2010.  axxi, 167 pages :billustrations, maps ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"RAND Investment in People and Ideas."  a"RAND National Security Research Division."  a"This research was conducted within the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD)"--Preface.  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 145-167) and index.0 aIntroduction -- The militant challenge -- Pakistani operations against militants -- Counterinsurgency and persuasion -- A population-centric strategy.  aSince 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affects U.S. national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and a range of other countries. Numerous militant networks-including al Qa'ida and other foreign fighters-exist in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North West Frontier Province. Pakistan will not be able to deal with the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the enemy, its top counterinsurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large potential to backfire.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format. 0aCounterinsurgencyzPakistan. 0aPakistanxPolitics and governmenty1988-1 aFair, C. Christine.eauthor.2 aRand Corporation.bNational Security Research Division2 aRand Corporation.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG982/