03546cam a2200517 i 4500001001900000003000500019005001700024008004100041010001700082020003500099020003800134027002100172035002000193037002200213040001900235043001200254050002700266245010400293264003700397300005100434336002600485337002600511337002800537338003600565338002700601500004800628500013000676504005200806505030600858520125601164530005802420610003502478650002402513650003002537700003302567700003002600700003002630700003102660700002802691700003102719700003102750710007802781710002202859710008002881856006702961rnd000000000094817RAND20200811100815.0101215s2010    caua     b    000 0 eng d  a  2010028999  a0833050397 (pbk. : alk. paper)  a9780833050397 (pbk. : alk. paper)  aRAND/MG-1026-OSD  a(Sirsi) a599594  c$22.00fpaperback  aCstmoRcCstmoR  aa-iq---00aHV6433.I722bQ357 201003aAn economic analysis of the financial records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq /cBenjamin Bahney ... [et al.]. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c2010.  axxii, 92 pages :bcolor illustrations ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"RAND National Defense Research Institute."  a"This research was conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface.  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 85-92).0 aIntroduction -- AQI and the Political and Economic Environment in Anbar Province -- Auditing al-Qa'ida in Iraq -- The Economics of AQI's Compensation -- The Flow of Expenditures and the Pace of Attacks -- Implications -- Appendix A: Anbar Province -- Appendix B: Time Line of Events in Anbar Province.  aThis monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group's power and influence. The authors draw on captured documents that give details on the daily financial transactions of one specific sector within Anbar province and of the financial transactions of the AQI provincial administration. Some of their conclusions are: AQI was a hierarchical organization with decentralized decisionmaking; AQI in Anbar was profitable enough to send substantial revenues out of the province in 2006; AQI relied on extortion, theft, and black market sales to fund its operations in Anbar; AQI needed large, regular revenue sources to fund its operations, but its administrative leaders did not hold much cash on hand. The authors' interpretation of data on compensation practices and participants' risk of death indicates that AQI members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group. The authors also find that mounting attacks required organizational expenditures well beyond the cost of materiel used in attacks. One major conclusion is that disrupting AQI's financial flows could disrupt the pace of their attacks.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.20aQaida (Organization)xFinance. 0aTerrorismxFinance. 0aTerrorismzIraqxFinance.1 aBahney, Benjamin W.eauthor.1 aShatz, Howard J.eauthor.1 aGanier, Carroll.eauthor.1 aMcpherson, Renny.eauthor.1 aSude, Barbara.eauthor.1 aElson, Sara Beth.eauthor.1 aSchbley, Ghassan.eauthor.2 aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.).bInternational Policy Center.2 aRand Corporation.1 aUnited States.bDepartment of Defense.bOffice of the Secretary of Defense.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html