02074cam a2200421 i 4500001001900000003000500019008004100024010001600065020002200081027001900103035002000122037001100142040001900153043003000172050002100202100003400223245007500257264003700332300002600369336002600395337002600421337002800447338003600475338002700511500003200538500002200570504004100592520060100633530005801234588004701292650004101339650001701380651007401397710006901471710002201540710003101562856005901593rnd000000000047286RAND920212s1984    cau      b    000 0 eng d  a   84015018  a0833005871 (pbk.)  aRAND/R-3000-AF  a(Sirsi) a188337  c$20.00  aCstmoRcCstmoR  ae-ur---aa-is---aa-le--- 4aUG700b.L36 19841 aLambeth, Benjamin S.eauthor.10aMoscow's lessons from the 1982 Lebanon air war /cBenjamin S. Lambeth. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c1984.  axi, 46 pages ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"Project Air Force"--Cover.  a"September 1984."  aIncludes bibliographical references.  aThis report reviews Soviet impressions of Israeli air operations during the 1982 Lebanon war. It evaluates a 1983 article published in Soviet Air Force Monthly (whose audience includes Soviet aircrews), that assesses the implications of the Israeli-Syrian air battles. For Western audiences, the article provides insights into how the Soviets have interpreted the Beka'a Valley experience. It appears that the Soviets have either deliberately misrepresented Israel's air combat results to their own pilots or else failed to comprehend the tactical lessons suggested by Israeli combat performance.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.  aDescription based on print version record. 0aAeronautics, MilitaryzSoviet Union. 0aAir warfare. 0aLebanonxHistoryyIsraeli intervention, 1982-1984xAerial operations.2 aProject Air Force (U.S.).bNational Security Strategies Program.2 aRand Corporation.1 aUnited States.bAir Force.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3000/