02963cam a2200421 i 4500001001900000003000500019008004100024010001600065020001500081027002700096035002000123037001100143040001900154043001200173050002400185100003600209245011300245264003700358300002800395336002600423337002600449337002800475338003600503338002700539500005000566504004100616520138800657530005802045588004702103650003402150651005002184651004402234710010202278710002202380710003702402710004302439856005902482rnd000000000047826RAND920212s1991    cau      b    000 0 eng d  a   92140197  a0833011650  aRAND/R-4072-CENTCOM/JS  a(Sirsi) a189053  c$20.00  aCstmoRcCstmoR  aap-----00aUA995.P47bL47 19911 aLesser, Ian O.,d1957-eauthor.10aOil, the Persian Gulf, and grand strategy :bcontemporary issues in historical perspective /cIan O. Lesser. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c1991.  axiii, 31 pages ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"National Defense Research Institute"--Cover.  aIncludes bibliographical references.  aTwo distinct and competing traditions, the autarkic-continental and the liberal-maritime, have played a key role in shaping grand strategy toward economically vital regions such as the Persian Gulf. These two traditions have historically differed in three main ways: how they view the overseas supply of resources (liability vs. asset), their preferred strategy of access to vital regions (continental vs. maritime), and their impetus for action (geopolitical vs. vital interests).  The author reaches a number of conclusions with implications for U.S. policy: (1) effective strategy toward the Persian Gulf and its oil resources has always been developed in the context of broader, grand-strategic objectives; (2) resource-related needs and objectives have tended to be determined by broader strategic aims, not vice versa; (3) the coalition approach to Persian Gulf security that has characterized U.S. strategy since the Carter Administration is within the Anglo-American liberal-maritime tradition regarding access to economically vital areas; (4) the perception of the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest has remained constant and is not simply the result of its oil production; and (5) the rise of powerful regional actors (e.g., Iran, Iraq) is new, but it does not mean that U.S. freedom of action will be constrained or that the need for military power will be reduced.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.  aDescription based on print version record. 0aWorld politicsy20th century. 0aPersian Gulf RegionxPolitics and government. 0aPersian Gulf RegionxStrategic aspects.2 aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.).bInternational Security and Defense Strategy Program.2 aRand Corporation.1 aUnited States.bCentral Command.1 aUnited States.bJoint Chiefs of Staff.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4072/