03001cam a2200421 i 4500 rnd000000000120485 RAND 20200811100907.0 960805s1996 cau b 000 0 eng d 0833024051 RAND/MR-569-A (Sirsi) a385828 $13.00 CstmoR CstmoR ncpn--- n-us--- U240 .T24927 1996 Taw, Jennifer M., 1964- author. Operation Just Cause : lessons for operations other than war / Jennifer Morrison Taw. Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 1996. xv, 40 pages ; 28 cm text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia unmediated n rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier volume nc rdacarrier "Arroyo Center." Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-40). The study of past operations is helpful in defining U.S. Army roles and functions in military operations other than war (OOTW) and in assessing the range of missions and requirements the Army is likely to face in the future. Operation Just Cause (OJC) can be distinguished from subsequent OOTW--in Kuwait, Iraq, Bangladesh, Bosnia, and Somalia--in part because it was a unilateral effort that did not involve coalition issues or problems. Nor did the United States have to coordinate its efforts with nongovernment organizations or humanitarian relief organizations. Nevertheless, OJC offers the Army some practical lessons for current and future OOTW: (1) Army training in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is inadequate; (2) electronic intelligence is insufficient in OOTW and must be supplemented by human intelligence and imagery; (3) efforts to streamline joint operations must not overlook service-specific needs, and must take care to maximize the use of special operations forces by employing them in the specialized tasks for which they were trained; (4) more emphasis is needed on equipment technology for the special requirements of MOUT; (5) planning for OOTW must not overlook or underemphasize stability operations (as was the case in OJC); and (6) civilian agencies (including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development) must be involved in the planning for most OOTW, but need to develop the capability to offer valuable and timely contributions. Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format. United States. Army Civil functions. Low-intensity conflicts (Military science) United States. Unified operations (Military science) Panama History American Invasion, 1989. United States Military policy. Arroyo Center. Strategy and Doctrine Program. Rand Corporation. United States. Army. Online Access http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR569/ 599144 599144