03032cam a2200433 i 4500001001900000003000500019005001700024008004100041020001500082027001800097035002000115037001100135040001900146043002100165050002300186100003800209245009200247264003700339300002600376336002600402337002600428337002800454338003600482338002700518500002100545504005200566520150500618530005802123610004302181650006302224650004202287651004602329651003602375710005102411710002202462710002602484856006902510999001902579rnd000000000120485RAND20200811100907.0960805s1996    cau      b    000 0 eng d  a0833024051  aRAND/MR-569-A  a(Sirsi) a385828  c$13.00  aCstmoRcCstmoR  ancpn---an-us---00aU240b.T24927 19961 aTaw, Jennifer M.,d1964-eauthor.10aOperation Just Cause :blessons for operations other than war /cJennifer Morrison Taw. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c1996.  axv, 40 pages ;c28 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"Arroyo Center."  aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 37-40).  aThe study of past operations is helpful in defining U.S. Army roles and functions in military operations other than war (OOTW) and in assessing the range of missions and requirements the Army is likely to face in the future. Operation Just Cause (OJC) can be distinguished from subsequent OOTW--in Kuwait, Iraq, Bangladesh, Bosnia, and Somalia--in part because it was a unilateral effort that did not involve coalition issues or problems. Nor did the United States have to coordinate its efforts with nongovernment organizations or humanitarian relief organizations. Nevertheless, OJC offers the Army some practical lessons for current and future OOTW: (1) Army training in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is inadequate; (2) electronic intelligence is insufficient in OOTW and must be supplemented by human intelligence and imagery; (3) efforts to streamline joint operations must not overlook service-specific needs, and must take care to maximize the use of special operations forces by employing them in the specialized tasks for which they were trained; (4) more emphasis is needed on equipment technology for the special requirements of MOUT; (5) planning for OOTW must not overlook or underemphasize stability operations (as was the case in OJC); and (6) civilian agencies (including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development) must be involved in the planning for most OOTW, but need to develop the capability to offer valuable and timely contributions.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.10aUnited States.bArmyxCivil functions. 0aLow-intensity conflicts (Military science)zUnited States. 0aUnified operations (Military science) 0aPanamaxHistoryyAmerican Invasion, 1989. 0aUnited StatesxMilitary policy.2 aArroyo Center.bStrategy and Doctrine Program.2 aRand Corporation.1 aUnited States.bArmy.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR569/  c599144d599144