02144cam a2200373 i 4500001001900000003000500019008004100024010001600065020001500081027001600096035002000112037001100132040001900143043001200162050002300174100003200197245006900229264003700298300002600335336002600361337002600387337002800413338003600441338002700477500014700504504004900651520077700700530005801477588004701535651005301582710005401635710002201689856005901711rnd000000000047773RAND920212s1991 cau b 000 0 eng d a 91226376 a0833010751 aRAND/R-3949 a(Sirsi) a188996 c$20.00 aCstmoRcCstmoR aa-af---00aDS371.3b.K43 19911 aKhalilzad, Zalmay.eauthor.10aProspects for the Afghan interim government /cZalmay Khalilzad. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c1991. axv, 43 pages ;c23 cm atextbtxt2rdacontent acomputerbc2rdamedia aunmediatedbn2rdamedia aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier avolumebnc2rdacarrier aThis research "was conducted in the International Security and Defense Policy program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute"--Preface. aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 43). aThis report assesses the prospects for the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) formed by the Pakistan-based mujahedin leaders in February 1989 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It focuses on the following issues: (1) whether the AIG is an asset, a liability, or of no importance in the conflict between the mujahedin and the Kabul regime; (2) the attitude of key commanders, the Afghan leaders based in Pakistan, and other noted Afghans toward the AIG; (3) the prospects for broadening the AIG; (4) the alternatives proposed by the important Afghans--the AIG leaders, resistance commanders, and the former king--on how the AIG should be broadened or replaced; (5) the implications if the AIG is not broadened; and (6) the alternatives to the current AIG. aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format. aDescription based on print version record. 0aAfghanistanxPolitics and governmenty1973-1989.2 aInternational Security and Defense Policy Center.2 aRand Corporation.41yOnline Accessuhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3949/