02623cam a2200421 i 4500001001900000003000500019008004100024010001300065020001500078027001900093035002000112037001100132040001900143043001200162050002000174100003100194245006500225264003700290300002800327336002600355337002600381337002800407338003600435338002700471500007700498500004300575504004100618520116500659530005801824588004701882650003601929650002101965651003601986710004102022710002202063710003802085856007802123rnd000000000111940RAND930803s1993    cau      b    000 0 eng d  a93025248  a0833014013  aRAND/MR-231-CC  a(Sirsi) a343582  c$15.00  aCstmoRcCstmoR  an-us---00aU264b.L49 19931 aLevine, Robert A.eauthor.10aUniform deterrence of nuclear first use /cRobert A. Levine. 1aSanta Monica, CA :bRAND,c1993.  axiii, 73 pages ;c23 cm  atextbtxt2rdacontent  acomputerbc2rdamedia  aunmediatedbn2rdamedia  aonline resourcebcr2rdacarrier  avolumebnc2rdacarrier  a"Project on Avoiding Nuclear War: Managing Conflict in the Nuclear Age."  a"RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies."  aIncludes bibliographical references.  aThis report proposes initial discussion of a United States-led international policy of Uniform Deterrence of Nuclear First Use (UD). The purpose of such a policy would be to preserve the "firebreak" between nuclear and all other types of weapons, which since 1945 has been the key to preventing nuclear combat. The report analyzes both the role of UD in achieving its primary objective of deterring first use, and implementation of punishment for first use (preferably non-nuclear punishment) if deterrence fails. The discussion stresses the distinction between the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons, which is the purpose of UD, and policies to discourage proliferation of the possession of nuclear weapons; but it contends that UD and anti-proliferation efforts should be complementary. The primary conclusion is that although implementation after a failure of deterrence would be difficult, it would not be impossible, and that UD can materially decrease the likelihood of first use in many cases. An open question is its acceptability, internationally and within the United States, which is why this report is an opening of discussion, not a closure.  aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.  aDescription based on print version record. 0aNo first use (Nuclear strategy) 0aNuclear warfare. 0aUnited StatesxMilitary policy.2 aRand/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.2 aRand Corporation.2 aCarnegie Corporation of New York.41yOnline Accessu http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR231.pdf