TY  - BOOK
AU  - Libicki,Martin C.
AU  - Jackson,Brian A.
AU  - Frelinger,Dave
AU  - Lachman,Beth E.
AU  - Ip,Cesse
AU  - Kalra,Nidhi
ED  - National Defense Research Institute (U.S.).
ED  - Rand Corporation.
TI  - What should be classified?: a framework with application to the Global Force Management Data Initiative 
SN  - 083305001X (pbk. : alk. paper)
AV  - HF5549.5.E429 W435 2010
PY  - 2010///
CY  - Santa Monica, CA
PB  - RAND
KW  - United States
KW  - Department of Defense
KW  - Appropriations and expenditures
KW  - Management
KW  - Computer networks
KW  - Security measures
KW  - Defense information, Classified
KW  - Information policy
KW  - National security
KW  - Security classification (Government documents)
KW  - Unified operations (Military science)
KW  - Armed Forces
KW  - Personnel management
N1  - "RAND National Defense Research Institute."; "This research was ... conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface; Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88); Introduction -- A framework for classification decisions -- The Global Force Management Data Initiative and its effects -- Potential security concerns and the possible benefits of classification -- Concluding observations and recommendations -- Appendix: Sample attribute labels; Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format
N2  - For its operational planning and budget programming, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs frequent access to current, detailed data on authorized force structures for all the services. Having users aggregate this information themselves was difficult, time consuming, and error prone. Hence, DoD launched the Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI). While most of the data from the GFM DI are unclassified, the fact that it facilitates data aggregation raised concerns about what a potential adversary might be able to do with access to it and whether it would be better to classify such data and store it exclusively on the secure network. The authors address this question by looking at why material should or should not be classified, concluding that classification is warranted only (1) if it reduces the amount of information available to adversaries, (2) if the information kept from adversaries would tell them something they did not know, (3) if they could make better decisions based on this information, and (4) if such decisions would harm the United States. Using this framework, the authors balance the risks GFM DI poses against the costs to DoD of not having this information readily available to its own analysts. The authors conclude that overall classification is not necessary but suggest that some limited subsets may warrant additional protection
UR  - http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG989.html
ER  -