The credible threats and the assurance dilemma Pauly, Reid B. C. 1988- creator author aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut text bibliography Case studies. Print books. nyu 2025 monographic eng 236 pages "This book explains how coercion works in international relations. Threats must not only be credible, but they must also imply assurances that a coercer will not punish a target after it complies. The chapters explore coercive bargaining over the nuclear weapons ambitions of South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran"-- Provided by publisher. Introduction : when do threats work? -- The assurance dilemma : credible and conditional threats -- "I at least want to be guilty" : coercing South Africa into a corner -- "Sanctions with inspectors" : convincing Iraq to come clean -- "They will laugh at us" : coaxing Libya to confess -- "We knew that they knew we knew" : compelling Iran to concede -- Conclusion : the true sources of coercive leverage. Reid B.C. Pauly. Includes bibliographical references and index. Nuclear arms control Case studies Ultimatums (International relations) Case studies JZ5675 .P384 2025 Pauly, Reid B. C., 1988- Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 2025 (DLC) 2025001691 9781501782787 2025001692 au 250304 20251105073846.0 24089857 eng