Democratic constitutional design and public policy [electronic resource] : analysis and evidence / edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg.
Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2006.Description: viii, 373 p. : illISBN:- 0262033496 (alk. paper)
- 0262532808 (pbk. : alk. paper)
- 9780262532808
- 320.6 22
- JF51 .D46 2006eb
eBooks
Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction : Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, H�ulya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bj�rn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.
Electronic reproduction. Palo Alto, Calif. : ebrary, 2013. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ebrary affiliated libraries.