E-Voting and Identify [electronic resource] : 4th International Conference, Vote-ID 2013, Guildford, UK, July 17-19, 2013. Proceedings / edited by James Heather, Steve Schneider, Vanessa Teague.
Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ; 7985Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013Description: X, 211 p. 29 illus. online resourceContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783642391859
- Computer science
- Computer communication systems
- Special purpose computers
- Computer security
- Data encryption (Computer science)
- Application software
- Computers and civilization
- Computer Science
- Data Encryption
- Systems and Data Security
- Computer Communication Networks
- Special Purpose and Application-Based Systems
- Computer Appl. in Administrative Data Processing
- Computers and Society
- 005.82 23
- QA76.9.A25

Scaling Privacy Guarantees in Code-Verification Elections -- On the Specification and Verification of Voting Schemes -- Formal Model-based Validation for Tally Systems -- Vote Casting In Any Preferred Constituency: A New Voting Channel -- Attacking the Verification Code Mechanism in the Norwegian Internet Voting System.- A Formal Model for the Requirement of Verifiability in Electronic Voting by means of a Bulletin Board -- Analysis of an Electronic Boardroom Voting System -- Dispute Resolution in Accessible Voting Systems: The Design and Use of Audiotegrity -- Mental Models of Verifiability in Voting -- Towards a Practical Internet Voting Scheme Based on Malleable Proofs -- A Practical Coercion Resistant Voting Scheme Revisited.
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 4th International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, VoteID 2013, held in Guildford, UK, during July 17-19, 2013. The 12 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from 26 submissions. The papers include a range of works on end-to-end verifiable election systems, verifiably correct complex tallying algorithms, human perceptions of verifiability, formal models of verifiability and, of course, attacks on systems formerly advertised as verifiable.