Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Statebuilding and the reconstruction of Iraq's budgetary institutions -- The evolution of Iraqi budgetary institutions from the Ottomans and the British mandate through Saddam -- Pre-war planning for Iraq's economic and budgetary reconstruction -- Boots on the ground: the CPA and the new Iraqi budgetary process -- Building Iraqi ministerial capacity: the case of FMIS -- The 17th benchmark and the challenge of Iraqi budget execution -- Building Iraqi budgetary capacity -- Iraqi budgeting -- Successful state building in Iraq? Lessons from the reconstruction of Iraq's budgetary Institutions.

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.