000 04395nam a22005655i 4500
001 978-1-4020-6104-2
003 DE-He213
005 20160614135711.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100301s2007 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781402061042
_9978-1-4020-6104-2
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2
_2doi
049 _aAlfaisal Main Library
050 4 _aB67
072 7 _aPDA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aSCI075000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a501
_223
245 1 0 _aIntentional Acts and Institutional Facts
_h[electronic resource] :
_bEssays on John Searle's Social Ontology /
_cedited by Savas L. Tsohatzidis.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2007.
300 _aVIII, 226 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aTheory and Decision Library ;
_v41
505 0 _aAspects of Collective Intentionality -- Searle and Collective Intentions -- Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior -- Joint Action: The Individual Strikes Back -- Collective Speech Acts -- From Intentions to Institutions: Development and Evolution -- The Ontogeny of Social Ontology: Steps to Shared Intentionality and Status Functions -- Social Reality and Institutional Facts: Sociality Within and Without Intentionality -- Aspects of Institutional Reality -- The Varieties of Normativity: An Essay on Social Ontology -- A Behavioural Critique of Searle's Theory of Institutions -- Searle versus Durkheim -- Searle's Derivation of Promissory Obligation.
520 _aThis book includes ten original essays that critically examine central themes of John Searle’s ontology of society, as well as a new essay by Searle that summarizes and further develops his work in that area. The critical essays are grouped into three parts. Part I (Aspects of Collective Intentionality) examines the account of collective intention and action underlying Searle’s analysis of social and institutional facts, with special emphasis on how that account relates to the dispute between individualism and anti-individualism in the analysis of social behaviour, and to the opposition between internalism and externalism in the analysis of intentionality. Part II (From Intentions to Institutions: Development and Evolution) scrutinizes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic credentials of Searle’s view that, unlike other kinds of social facts, institutional facts are uniquely human, and develops original suggestions concerning their place in human evolution and development. Part III (Aspects of Institutional Reality) focuses on Searle’s claim that institutional facts owe their existence to the collective acceptance of constitutive rules whose effect is the creation of deontic powers, and examines central issues relevant to its assessment (among others, the status of the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, the significance of the distinction between brute and deontic powers, the issue of the logical derivability of normative from descriptive propositions, and the import of the difference between moral and non-moral normative principles). Written by an international team of philosophers and social scientists, the essays aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of Searle’s work on the ontology of society, and to suggest new approaches to fundamental questions in that research area.
650 0 _aPhilosophy.
650 0 _aOntology.
650 0 _aLanguage and languages
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aPhilosophy and science.
650 0 _aMedicine
_xPhilosophy.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Medicine.
650 2 4 _aOntology.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Language.
655 7 _aElectronic books.
_2local
700 1 _aTsohatzidis, Savas L.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781402061035
830 0 _aTheory and Decision Library ;
_v41
856 4 0 _uhttp://ezproxy.alfaisal.edu/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
942 _2lcc
_cEBOOKS
999 _c250343
_d250343