000			04252cam a2200541 a 4500
001			rnd000000000111535
003			RAND
005			20160615135106.0
008			051026s2005 caua b 000 0 eng d
010			_a 2005029744
020			_a0833038656 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a0833041037 (electronic bk.)
020			_a9780833038654
020			_a9780833041036 (electronic bk.)
027			_aRAND/MG-427-CTRMP
035			_a(Sirsi) a499684
037			_c$20.00 _fpaperback
040			_aCstmoR _cCstmoR
043			_an-us-ca
049			_aAlfaisal Main Library
050	0	0	_aKF1215 _b.D57 2005
245	0	0	_aDistribution of losses from large terrorist attacks under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act / _cStephen J. Carroll ... [et al.].
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, _c2005.
300			_axxxv, 116, pages : _billustrations ; _c28 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_a"RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 113-116).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act -- Terrorist Attack Scenarios -- The Distribution of Terrorist Attack Losses Under TRIA -- Distribution of Losses Under Possible Modifications to TRIA -- Conclusions and Implications for TRIA -- Appendix A: Estimating Losses and Insurance Compensation for Large Terrorist Attacks -- Appendix B: The RAND Anthrax Casualty Model and Casualty Distributions in the Indoor and Outdoor Anthrax Attacks -- Appendix C: Derivation of Equations (4.3) and (4.6)
520			_aFollowing the 9/11 attacks and the substantial losses incurred, insurers questioned their ability to pay claims in future attacks and began to exclude terrorism coverage from commercial insurance policies. The fear that a lack of insurance coverage would threaten economic stability and growth, urban development, and jobs led the federal government to adopt the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002. The pending expiration of TRIA requires that policymakers assess the effectiveness of TRIA and decide whether to extend, modify, or terminate it. A central issue for this assessment is how TRIA will redistribute losses among the different parties under different circumstances. To provide an accurate basis on which to determine the effects of TRIA, the authors simulate the expected losses and the distribution of losses among stakeholder groups for each of three attack modes: an aircraft impact on a major office building, an indoor anthrax attack on a major office building, and an outdoor anthrax attack in a major urban area. The study's results show that the ultimate distribution of losses under TRIA depends on the attack mode and cumulative annual losses. The authors also estimate the loss distribution that would result when different provisions of TRIA are changed. Based on this analysis, overall, the role of taxpayers is expected to be minimal in all but very rare cases, such as serial large attacks on major buildings, highly effective large outdoor anthrax releases, or nuclear detonations. In addition, while TRIA helps reduce uninsured terrorism losses by making coverage available and by limiting target insurers' exposure, the analysis in this study shows that, even with TRIA in place, a high fraction of losses would go uninsured in each of the attack scenarios examined.
530			_aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
650		0	_aInsurance, Casualty _xLaw and legislation _zUnited States.
650		0	_aRisk (Insurance) _zUnited States.
650		0	_aRisk management _zUnited States.
650		0	_aTerrorism insurance _zUnited States.
655		7	_aElectronic books. _2local
700	1		_aCarroll, Stephen J., _d1940- _eauthor.
700	1		_aLaTourrette, Tom, _d1963- _eauthor.
700	1		_aChow, Brian G. _eauthor.
700	1		_aJones, Gregory S. _eauthor.
700	1		_aMartin, Craig W. _eauthor.
710			_aRand eBooks.
856	4	0	_uhttp://ezproxy.alfaisal.edu/login?url=http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG427/
942			_2lcc _cEBOOKS
999			_c300041 _d300041