000			03265cam a2200433 i 4500
001			101256375
003			RAND
005			20200811100746.0
008			100302s2011 cauab b 001 0 eng d
020			_a0833051466 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020			_a9780833051462 (pbk. : alk. paper)
027			_aRAND/MG-835-AF
037			_c$34.00 _fpaperback
040			_aCstmoR _cCstmoR
043			_aa-is--- _aa-le---
050		4	_aDS87.65 _bL36 2011
100	1		_aLambeth, Benjamin S. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aAir operations in Israel's war against Hezbollah : _blearning from Lebanon and getting it right in Gaza / _cBenjamin S. Lambeth.
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, _c2011.
300			_axxxiii, 388 pages : _billustrations, maps ; _c23 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_a"RAND Project Air Force."
500			_a"The study, 'Israeli Air Operations Against Hezbollah,' was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project Air Force"--Pg. IV.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 345-366) and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Highlights of the Campaign -- Key Israeli Air Accomplishments -- Problems in Air Employment -- The Winograd Commission's Findings -- A Second Chance in Gaza -- The Second Lebanon War Reconsidered -- Conclusions.
520			_aIn response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a “failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government’s decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF’s more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF’s conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.
530			_aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610	1	0	_aIsrael. _bHel ha-avir.
610	2	0	_aHizballah (Lebanon)
650		0	_aArab-Israeli conflict _y1993- _xAerial operations, Israeli.
650		0	_aLebanon War, 2006 _xAerial operations, Israeli.
710	2		_aProject Air Force (U.S.). _bStrategy and Doctrine Program.
710	2		_aRand Corporation.
710	1		_aUnited States. _bAir Force.
856	4	1	_yOnline Access _uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG835.html
999			_c596832 _d596832