000			03948cam a2200481 i 4500
001			rnd000000000111652
003			RAND
005			20200811100801.0
008			071022s2007 cau b 000 0 eng d
010			_a 2007044048
020			_a0833042092 (pbk)
020			_a083304432X (electronic bk.)
020			_a9780833042095 (pbk.)
020			_a9780833044327 (electronic bk.)
027			_aRAND/MG-655-AF
035			_a(Sirsi) a516023
037			_c$22.00 _fpaperback
040			_aCstmoR _cCstmoR
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aUG633 _b.L258 2007
100	1		_aLambeth, Benjamin S. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aCombat pair : _bthe evolution of Air Force-Navy integration in strike warfare / _cBenjamin S. Lambeth.
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND Corp., _c2007.
300			_axxii, 105 pages ; _c23 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_a"RAND Project Air Force."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 99-105).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- A Backdrop of Apartness -- The Watershed of Desert Storm -- Post-Gulf War Navy Adjustments to New Demands -- First Steps Toward Integrated Strike-Warfare Training -- Continued Sources of Navy-Air Force Friction -- A Convergence of Integration over Afghanistan -- Further Convergence in Operation Iraqi Freedom -- Emergent Trends in Air Force-Navy Integration -- A New Synergy of Land- and Sea-Based Strike Warfare -- Future Challenges and Opportunities.
520			_aThis report documents the exceptional cross-service harmony that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have steadily developed in their conduct of integrated strike operations since the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. That close harmony contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed throughout most of the Cold War, when the two services maintained separate and unique operating mindsets and lacked any significant interoperability features. The most influential factor accounting for this gradual trend toward integration was the nation's ten-year experience with Operations Northern and Southern Watch, in which both Air Force land-based fighters and Navy carrier-based fighters jointly enforced the United Nations-imposed no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq that were first put into effect after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. That steady-state aerial policing function proved to be a real-world operations laboratory for the two services, and it ended up being the main crucible in which their eventual merger of operational practices was forged. The results were finally showcased by the all but seamless Air Force and Navy performance in their joint conduct of integrated aerial strike operations in the largely air-centric war in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002. They were further dramatized by the similarly near-seamless air-warfare performance of the two services during the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom that ensued a year later. These real-world experiences suggest that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. naval aviation should now consider each other natural allies in the roles and resources arena, since they did not compete but rather mutually supported and reinforced one another in the achievement of joint strike-warfare goals.
530			_aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610	1	0	_aUnited States. _bAir Force.
610	1	0	_aUnited States. _bMarine Corps _xAviation.
610	1	0	_aUnited States. _bNavy _xAviation.
650		0	_aAir warfare _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		0	_aUnified operations (Military science)
710	2		_aProject Air Force (U.S.). _bStrategy and Doctrine Program.
710	2		_aRand Corporation.
710	1		_aUnited States. _bAir Force.
856	4	1	_yOnline Access _uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG655/
999			_c597307 _d597307