000			04128cam a2200397 i 4500
001			rnd000000000112100
003			RAND
008			930415s1993 cauab b 000 0 eng d
020			_a0833021486
027			_aRAND/N-3411-RGSD
035			_a(Sirsi) a337481
037			_c$45.00
040			_aCstmoR _cCstmoR
050		4	_aJX1974 _b.H36 1993
100	1		_aHan, Yong-Sup. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aDesigning and evaluating conventional arms control measures, the case of the Korean Peninsula / _cYong-Sup Han.
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, _c1993.
300			_axvii, 194 pages : _billustrations, maps ; _c28 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aA RAND Graduate School dissertation ; _vN-3411
502			_aThesis (Ph. D.)--RAND Graduate School, 1993.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 183-194).
520			_aThe governments of South and North Korea have recently made proposals with mixed motives for arms control in the peninsula: either to settle a 45-year-old military confrontation with sincerity or to repeat past propaganda wars with each side blaming the other for posing threats. The analytic communities of the two Koreas have not systematically analyzed the effects of arms control proposals on the security and the stability of the peninsula, nor have they suggested coherent ways to relate arms control measures to security problems. This study attempts to design and evaluate effective arms control measures in relation to specific Korean security problems and arms control objectives that the South Korean government should undertake. The study takes a combined approach of qualitative analysis and military simulation. Three qualitative criteria derived from case studies on Korean and European arms control are used to examine whether these measures are legally binding, verifiable, and negotiable. One quantifiable criterion is used to test against the base case scenario (a one-day surprise attack by North Korea), to explore whether arms control measures will stabilize or destabilize the military status quo on the peninsula in terms of North Korea's extent of penetration in actual war situations. Four alternative measures are derived from the analysis: (1) confidence and security building measures (CSBMs); (2) establishment of an asymmetric non-deployment zone (NDZ); (3) reduction of the joint U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercises and North Korea's forward deployed forces; and (4) reduction of South Korean, U.S., and North Korean forces. Findings indicate that establishment of the NDZ and North Korean unilateral reduction can best achieve the goal of South Korean arms control. These two measures enhance stability, while a unilateral reduction or suspension of Team Spirit and CSBMS may only reduce military stability. CSBMs and a scale-down of Team Spirit are more easily verifiable than the NDZ and mutual reduction measures, because the latter measures would require more intrusive verification. Arms negotiations should be led by tight conditionality of one side's concession on the other side's concession. However, South Korea's concession (e.g., reduction of Team Spirit and withdrawal of U.S. forces) should guard against negative consequences of these measures on security and stability of the entire peninsula. Moreover, confidence building measures should be negotiated in one channel for negotiating reduction measures, since separating talks on these two issues is nearly impossible.
530			_aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
588			_aDescription based on print version record.
650		0	_aArms control.
650		0	_aNational security _zKorea (South)
651		0	_aKorea (North) _xMilitary relations _zKorea (South)
651		0	_aKorea (South) _xMilitary relations _zKorea (North)
710	2		_aRand Graduate School.
830		0	_aDissertation (Rand Graduate School) ; _vN-3411.
856	4	1	_yOnline Access _uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3411/
999			_c597609 _d597609