000 03546cam a2200517 i 4500
001 rnd000000000094817
003 RAND
005 20200811100815.0
008 101215s2010 caua b 000 0 eng d
010 _a 2010028999
020 _a0833050397 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020 _a9780833050397 (pbk. : alk. paper)
027 _aRAND/MG-1026-OSD
035 _a(Sirsi) a599594
037 _c$22.00
_fpaperback
040 _aCstmoR
_cCstmoR
043 _aa-iq---
050 0 0 _aHV6433.I722
_bQ357 2010
245 0 3 _aAn economic analysis of the financial records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq /
_cBenjamin Bahney ... [et al.].
264 1 _aSanta Monica, CA :
_bRAND,
_c2010.
300 _axxii, 92 pages :
_bcolor illustrations ;
_c23 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
500 _a"RAND National Defense Research Institute."
500 _a"This research was conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 85-92).
505 0 _aIntroduction -- AQI and the Political and Economic Environment in Anbar Province -- Auditing al-Qa'ida in Iraq -- The Economics of AQI's Compensation -- The Flow of Expenditures and the Pace of Attacks -- Implications -- Appendix A: Anbar Province -- Appendix B: Time Line of Events in Anbar Province.
520 _aThis monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group's power and influence. The authors draw on captured documents that give details on the daily financial transactions of one specific sector within Anbar province and of the financial transactions of the AQI provincial administration. Some of their conclusions are: AQI was a hierarchical organization with decentralized decisionmaking; AQI in Anbar was profitable enough to send substantial revenues out of the province in 2006; AQI relied on extortion, theft, and black market sales to fund its operations in Anbar; AQI needed large, regular revenue sources to fund its operations, but its administrative leaders did not hold much cash on hand. The authors' interpretation of data on compensation practices and participants' risk of death indicates that AQI members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group. The authors also find that mounting attacks required organizational expenditures well beyond the cost of materiel used in attacks. One major conclusion is that disrupting AQI's financial flows could disrupt the pace of their attacks.
530 _aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610 2 0 _aQaida (Organization)
_xFinance.
650 0 _aTerrorism
_xFinance.
650 0 _aTerrorism
_zIraq
_xFinance.
700 1 _aBahney, Benjamin W.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aShatz, Howard J.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aGanier, Carroll.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aMcpherson, Renny.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aSude, Barbara.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aElson, Sara Beth.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aSchbley, Ghassan.
_eauthor.
710 2 _aNational Defense Research Institute (U.S.).
_bInternational Policy Center.
710 2 _aRand Corporation.
710 1 _aUnited States.
_bDepartment of Defense.
_bOffice of the Secretary of Defense.
856 4 1 _yOnline Access
_uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1026.html
999 _c597736
_d597736