000 03753cam a2200481 i 4500
001 rnd000000000111660
003 RAND
005 20200811100831.0
008 070920s2007 caua 000 0 eng d
010 _a 2007039017
020 _a0833042351
020 _a0833044338 (electronic bk.)
020 _a9780833042354 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020 _a9780833044334 (electronic bk.)
027 _aRAND/MG-679-CTRMP
035 _a(Sirsi) lc514272
040 _aCstmoR
_cCstmoR
043 _an-us---
050 0 0 _aHG8535
_b.F43 2007
245 0 4 _aThe federal role in terrorism insurance :
_bevaluating alternatives in an uncertain world /
_cLloyd Dixon ... [et al.].
264 1 _aSanta Monica, CA :
_bRAND Corp.,
_c2007.
300 _axxvi, 121 pages :
_billustrations
_c28 cm.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
500 _a"RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management and Policy."
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 117-121).
505 0 _aIntroduction -- Analytic Methods -- Consequences of Allowing TRIA to Expire -- Consequences of Requiring Insurers to Offer Terrorism Coverage for Conventional and NBCR Attacks -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: RMS's Probabilistic Terrorism Model -- Appendix B: Policyholder Take-Up of Terrorism Insurance -- Appendix C: Loss-Distribution Model -- Appendix D: Identifying Key Factors Driving Trade-Offs Between Interventions -- Appendix E: Calculating Expected Losses with Multiple Probability Distributions.
520 _aConcerned that the unavailability of terrorism insurance would impede economic recovery and hinder growth after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). TRIA will sunset at the end of 2007 unless Congress takes further action. This book examines the implications of allowing TRIA to expire and of enhancements aimed at improving the availability and affordability of insurance for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) attacks. The analysis takes a systematic approach to addressing the deep uncertainties that underlie the market for terrorism insurance and is the first study of TRIA to consider not just taxpayer payments through the program but also the cost of government compensation and assistance following a terrorist attack when analyzing the program's effect on government spending. The authors conclude that taxpayer cost is lower with TRIA than without TRIA across a broad range of assumptions about attack frequency and the proportion of uninsured losses that are compensated postattack. The analysis also cautions policymakers to be careful when modifying the program to better address NBCR attacks: Simply expanding the program to require insurers to offer NBCR coverage may not achieve the desired outcomes. The authors identify program changes that will produce positive results for both NBCR and conventional attacks that are robust to key underlying uncertainties.
530 _aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610 1 0 _aUnited States.
_tTerrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.
650 0 _aRisk (Insurance)
_zUnited States.
650 0 _aTerrorism insurance
_xGovernment policy
_zUnited States.
650 0 _aTerrorism
_xEconomic aspects
_zUnited States.
700 1 _aDixon, Lloyd S.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aLempert, Robert J.
_eauthor.
700 1 _aLaTourrette, Tom,
_d1963-
_eauthor.
700 1 _aReville, Robert T.
_eauthor.
710 2 _aRAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management and Policy.
710 2 _aRand Corporation.
856 4 1 _yOnline Access
_uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG679/
999 _c598102
_d598102