000			03316cam a2200505 i 4500
001			rnd000000000071203
003			RAND
005			20200811100903.0
008			011112s2001 cauab b 00 0 eng d
010			_a 2001048221
020			_a0833030507
020			_a0833032372 (electronic bk.)
020			_a9780833030504
020			_a9780833032379 (electronic bk.)
027			_aRAND/MR-1365-AF
035			_a(Sirsi) a427510
037			_c$35.00 _fpaperback
037			_c$35.00 _fpaperback
040			_aCstmoR _cCstmoR
043			_ae-yu--- _an-us---
050	0	0	_aDR2087.5 _b.L36 2001
100	1		_aLambeth, Benjamin S. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aNATO's air war for Kosovo : _ba strategic and operational assessment / _cBenjamin S. Lambeth.
264		1	_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, _c2001.
300			_axxxiv, 276 pages : _billustrations, maps ; _v23 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_a"Project Air Force Series on Operation Allied Force"--Cover.
500			_a"Project Air Force."
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 251-276).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Prelude to Combat -- The Air War Unfolds -- Why Milosevic Gave up When He Did -- Accomplishments of the Air War -- Friction and Operational Problems -- Lapses in Strategy and Implementation -- Nato's Air War in Perspective.
520			_aThis book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.
530			_aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610	2	0	_aNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization.
650		0	_aBombing, Aerial _zYugoslavia _zKosovo (Serbia)
650		0	_aOperation Allied Force, 1999.
651		0	_aKosovo (Serbia) _xHistory _yCivil War, 1998- _xAerial operations.
651		0	_aKosovo (Serbia) _xHistory _yCivil War, 1998- _xParticipation, Foreign.
710	2		_aProject Air Force (U.S.). _bStrategy and Doctrine Program.
710	2		_aRand Corporation.
710	1		_aUnited States. _bAir Force.
856	4	1	_yOnline Access _uhttp://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1365/
999			_c599021 _d599021