| 000 | 02813cam a2200433 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | rnd000000000093829 | ||
| 003 | RAND | ||
| 008 | 940616s1994 cau 000 0 eng d | ||
| 010 | _a94010797 | ||
| 020 | _a0833015346 | ||
| 027 | _aRAND/MR-434-A | ||
| 035 | _a(Sirsi) a360004 | ||
| 037 | _c$7.50 | ||
| 040 |
_aCstmoR _cCstmoR |
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| 043 |
_aa-kn--- _an-us--- |
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| 050 | 0 | 0 |
_aUA23 _b.W374 1994 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aWendt, James C., _d1944- _eauthor. |
|
| 245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe North Korean nuclear program : _bwhat is to be done? / _cJames C. Wendt. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aSanta Monica, CA : _bRAND, _c1994. |
|
| 300 |
_axii, 27 pages ; _c28 cm |
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| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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| 500 | _a"Arroyo Center." | ||
| 504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references. | ||
| 520 | _aThis report examines the possible outcomes of the North Korean threat to withdraw from the NPT and outlines alternative approaches for accomplishing U.S. security objectives affected by this situation. The report evaluates four approaches--constructive engagement, grand deal, pressure, and graduated incentives--in terms of whether the approaches help accomplish U.S. security objectives, whether they can be implemented given the other regional players involved, and whether they are robust given the fluidity of the situation in Korea. The report concludes that an approach that combines graduated incentives with pressure if the first approach fails is the most effective approach for meeting all three criteria. Specifically, the graduated incentives approach could accomplish all the U.S. security objectives, while the pressure approach could accomplish the major ones; in terms of implementation, graduated incentives is supported now and would lay the groundwork for regional support for pressure by demonstrating the United States has "gone the extra mile"; and in terms of robustness, graduated incentives would be effective if the North Korean "price" is low enough, while pressure could be effective regardless of North Korean motivation and would be consistent with a policy of counterproliferation. | ||
| 530 | _aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format. | ||
| 588 | _aDescription based on print version record. | ||
| 650 | 0 | _aNuclear nonproliferation. | |
| 650 | 0 |
_aNuclear weapons _zKorea (North) |
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| 651 | 0 |
_aKorea (North) _xMilitary relations _zUnited States. |
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| 651 | 0 |
_aUnited States _xMilitary policy. |
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| 651 | 0 |
_aUnited States _xMilitary relations _zKorea (North) |
|
| 710 | 2 |
_aArroyo Center. _bStrategy and Doctrine Program. |
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| 710 | 2 | _aRand Corporation. | |
| 710 | 1 |
_aUnited States. _bArmy. |
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| 856 | 4 | 1 |
_yOnline Access _uhttp://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR434/ |
| 999 |
_c599116 _d599116 |
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