000 03001cam a2200421 i 4500
001 rnd000000000120485
003 RAND
005 20200811100907.0
008 960805s1996 cau b 000 0 eng d
020 _a0833024051
027 _aRAND/MR-569-A
035 _a(Sirsi) a385828
037 _c$13.00
040 _aCstmoR
_cCstmoR
043 _ancpn---
_an-us---
050 0 0 _aU240
_b.T24927 1996
100 1 _aTaw, Jennifer M.,
_d1964-
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aOperation Just Cause :
_blessons for operations other than war /
_cJennifer Morrison Taw.
264 1 _aSanta Monica, CA :
_bRAND,
_c1996.
300 _axv, 40 pages ;
_c28 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
500 _a"Arroyo Center."
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 37-40).
520 _aThe study of past operations is helpful in defining U.S. Army roles and functions in military operations other than war (OOTW) and in assessing the range of missions and requirements the Army is likely to face in the future. Operation Just Cause (OJC) can be distinguished from subsequent OOTW--in Kuwait, Iraq, Bangladesh, Bosnia, and Somalia--in part because it was a unilateral effort that did not involve coalition issues or problems. Nor did the United States have to coordinate its efforts with nongovernment organizations or humanitarian relief organizations. Nevertheless, OJC offers the Army some practical lessons for current and future OOTW: (1) Army training in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) is inadequate; (2) electronic intelligence is insufficient in OOTW and must be supplemented by human intelligence and imagery; (3) efforts to streamline joint operations must not overlook service-specific needs, and must take care to maximize the use of special operations forces by employing them in the specialized tasks for which they were trained; (4) more emphasis is needed on equipment technology for the special requirements of MOUT; (5) planning for OOTW must not overlook or underemphasize stability operations (as was the case in OJC); and (6) civilian agencies (including the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development) must be involved in the planning for most OOTW, but need to develop the capability to offer valuable and timely contributions.
530 _aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
610 1 0 _aUnited States.
_bArmy
_xCivil functions.
650 0 _aLow-intensity conflicts (Military science)
_zUnited States.
650 0 _aUnified operations (Military science)
651 0 _aPanama
_xHistory
_yAmerican Invasion, 1989.
651 0 _aUnited States
_xMilitary policy.
710 2 _aArroyo Center.
_bStrategy and Doctrine Program.
710 2 _aRand Corporation.
710 1 _aUnited States.
_bArmy.
856 4 1 _yOnline Access
_uhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR569/
999 _c599144
_d599144