000 02331cam a22004698i 4500
001 24089857
003 US-DLC
005 20251105073846.0
006 m |o d |
007 cr_|||||||||||
008 250304s2025 nyu ob 001 0 eng
010 _a 2025001692
020 _z9781501782701
_qpdf
020 _z9781501782688
_qhardcover
020 _z9781501782695
_qepub
020 _a9781501782787
_qpaperback
035 _a24089857
035 _a(DLC)24049527
040 _aau
_beng
_cau
_erda
042 _apcc
049 _aAlfaisal Main Library
050 0 0 _aJZ5675
_b.P384 2025
100 1 _aPauly, Reid B. C.,
_d1988-
_eauthor
_4aut
_4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
245 1 4 _aThe art of coercion :
_bcredible threats and the assurance dilemma /
_cReid B.C. Pauly.
260 _c2025
263 _a2506
264 1 _aIthaca, New York :
_bCornell University Press,
_c2025.
300 _a236 pages
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 0 _aCornell studies in security affairs
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 _aIntroduction : when do threats work? -- The assurance dilemma : credible and conditional threats -- "I at least want to be guilty" : coercing South Africa into a corner -- "Sanctions with inspectors" : convincing Iraq to come clean -- "They will laugh at us" : coaxing Libya to confess -- "We knew that they knew we knew" : compelling Iran to concede -- Conclusion : the true sources of coercive leverage.
520 _a"This book explains how coercion works in international relations. Threats must not only be credible, but they must also imply assurances that a coercer will not punish a target after it complies. The chapters explore coercive bargaining over the nuclear weapons ambitions of South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran"-- Provided by publisher.
650 0 _aNuclear arms control
_vCase studies
650 0 _aUltimatums (International relations)
_vCase studies
655 7 _aCase studies.
_2lcgft
655 0 _aPrint books.
_2local
_94
776 1 _iPrint version:
_aPauly, Reid B. C., 1988-
_tArt of coercion
_dIthaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 2025
_z9781501782688
_w(DLC) 2025001691
942 _2lcc
_cBOOKS
999 _c607797
_d607797