000			05252cam a22004338i 4500
001			23987928
003			US-DLC
005			20251223141639.0
008			250108s2025 nju b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2024042299
020			_a9780691232829 _q(hardback)
020			_z9780691233468 _q(ebook)
035			_a23987928
040			_aau _beng _erda _cau
042			_apcc
043			_an-us---
049			_aAlfaisal Main Library
050	0	0	_aHG1778.U5 _bC66 2025
100	1		_aConti-Brown, Peter, _d1981- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aPrivate finance, public power : _ba history of bank supervision in America / _cPeter Conti-Brown, Sean H. Vanatta.
260			_c2025
263			_a2506
264		1	_aPrinceton : _bPrinceton University Press, _c2025
300			_a412 pages cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520			_a"How regulating the banks became a separate and strange category of government power. Banks are unlike most other businesses, and over centuries, regulating banks has become a category of government power all its own. For some, the appropriate role of those supervising the banks approximates cops on the beat patrolling for crime; for others they should be more like fire wardens responding to emergencies. In real life they are compliance officers and auditors, risk managers and crisis responders, the bane of international drug cartels, and the friends of bank CEOs. The mandate of "supervising the banks" is not regulation and it is not the implementation of regulation. Rather, it is a fundamentally different way that the government exercises power over, and sometimes with, markets and society. The Banker's Thumb tells the history of this unusual form of public power. It argues that bank supervision is the "institutionalization of discretion" exercised by government actors over private banks and, eventually, the financial system as a whole. Authors Peter Conti-Brown and Sean H. Vanatta show how this supervision developed in fits and starts from roots in state law to become a residual category into which Congress has tossed a hodgepodge of distinct and at times conflicting paradigms of power, across a growing group of organizations engaged in interminable conflict. Understanding what this system is, where it came from, and how political actors and financial market participants engage with it can help organize the growing field of financial regulation. Conti-Brown and Vanatta also show how the history of bank supervision expands and sometimes challenges prevailing historical conceptions of state power and its many twists and turns through the 19th and 20th centuries, which can inform broader discussions about politics, law, finance, and the development of state and administrative capacity in the United States"--
520			_a"The strange and contested evolution of the management of banking riskBanks in America are private institutions with private shareholders, boards of directors, profit motives, customers, and competitors. And yet the public plays a key role in deciding what risks are taken as well as how, when, and to what end. Public-private negotiations over financial governance has evolved into an essential ecosystem of banking risk management. In Private Finance, Public Power, Peter Conti-Brown and Sean Vanatta offer a new history of finance and public policy in the United States by examining the idiosyncratic way the nation manages financial risk across the public-private divide. Covering two centuries, from the founding of the Republic to the early 1980s, Conti-Brown and Vanatta describe the often-contested, sometimes chaotic, engagement of bankers, politicians, bureaucrats, and others in the overlapping spaces of the public-private system of bank supervision.Conti-Brown and Vanatta trace the different supervisory frameworks that evolved over time, from the imposition of private liability on bank shareholders to the development of the central bank to the creation of federal deposit insurance. Negotiations took place at federal and state levels, but, over time, the federal government assumed most of the responsibility for managing financial risk. Moreover, federal supervisory officials began to undertake more varied tasks, including monitoring racial discrimination and managing financial concentration. Conti-Brown and Vanatta introduce a diverse cast of characters-bankers, politicians, bureaucrats, and others-and show how they navigated two hundred years of financial panics, scandals, and crises to build the system that structures modern America's banking system"--
650		0	_aBanks and banking _xState supervision _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		0	_aBanking law _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking _2bisacsh
650		7	_aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Business Law _2bisacsh
655		0	_aPrint books. _2local _94
700	1		_aVanatta, Sean H., _eauthor.
776	0	8	_iOnline version: _aConti-Brown, Peter, 1981- _tPrivate finance, public power _dPrinceton : Princeton University Press, [2025] _z9780691233468 _w(DLC) 2024042300
942			_2lcc _cBOOKS
999			_c608172 _d608172